

Message Text

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GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR

SUBJECT: 1974: THE INTERNAL POLITICAL BALANCE SHEET

REF: SEPTTEL

1. SUMMARY: INTERNALLY, THE SOVIET LEADERWHIP FOUND 1974 A GOOD YEAR. THE ECONOMY PERFORMED REASONABLY WELL, BUT LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS WAS MADE TOWARD PROMISED REORGANIZATIONS. BREZHNEV'S POOR HEALTH, HOWEVER, HAS UNDOUBTEDLY CAUSED THE SOVIETS TO PONDER THE POLITICAL SUCCESSION. EITHER AN INTERREGNUM LEADERSHIP BY THE SURVIVING SENIORS OR A MOVE TO PICK A YOUNGER SUCCESSOR SUCH AS SHCHERBITSKIY OR KULAKOV SEEMS POSSIBLE. IN ANY CASE, THE TRADITIONAL ISSUES SUCH AS RESOURCE ALLOCATION WILL CERTAINLY PLAY A LARGE PART IN THE POLITICAL JOCKEYING FOR SUCCESSION. DURING THE YEAR A CONSIDERABLE TAMING OF THE INTERNAL OPPOSITION TOOK PLACE THROUGH A SELECTIVE POLICY OF REMOVAL AND INTIMIDATION OF KEY DISSIDENT LEADERS THROUGH EXILE OR IMPRISONMENT. JEWISH EMIGRATION WAS REDUCED ABOUT 40 PER CENT FROM THE 1973 PEAK, AND THE REGIME HAS SHOWN ITS ABILITY TO CONTROL THE FLOW THROUGH PERSUASION AND ADMINISTRATIVE TECHNIQUES. WHILE THE LITERARY SCENE SHOWED SOME LOW-LEVEL SIGNS OF LIFE, THE ART WORLD BRIEFLY CHALLENGED THE REGIME'S STRICTURES ON PAINTING AND FURTHER ACTIVITY THIS YEAR ON THIS FRONT IS LIKELY. PUBLIC LIFE WAS MARKED BY AARTY EFFORTS TO WHIP UP LABOR PRODUCTIVITY THROUGH JAWBONING, WHEREAS THE PUBLIC REMAINS INTERESTED CHIEFLY IN BETTERING ITS MATERIAL LIFE WITHOUT ACTUALLY WORKING TERRIBLY HARD TO ACHIEVE THAT END.

2. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP CAN LOOK BACK ON INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN 1974 WITH A GOOD DEAL OF SATISFACTION IN MOST AREAS. THE CHRONIC PROBLEMS OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND THE NEED TO PLOT FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF THE SOCIETY AND THE ECONOMY REMAIN WITH THE LEADERSHIP, BUT THE IMPROVING SOVIET BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND UNINSPIRED BUT ADEQUATE DOMESTIC ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE HAVE EASED THESE PROBLEMS CONSIDERABLY. END SUMMARY.

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3. SATISFACTORY ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE BUT NO REFORMS. INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE WAS REGARDED AS MEDIOCRE BUT ADEQUATE IN 1974. THE WHEAT HARVEST WAS THE SECOND LARGEST ON RECORD ALTHOUGH IT FELL SOMEWHAT SHORT OF SOVIET HOPES AS ALSO DID THE SUGARBEET CROP. HOWEVER, FOOD SUPPLIES HAVE RANGED FROM ADEQUATE TO GOOD, AND SHORTAGES HAVE BEEN SPORADIC AND BRIEF. THE MAJOR PROBLEM FACING THE LEADERSHIP IS HOW TO UPGRADE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ECONOMY AND THE QUALITY OF PRODUCTS. DESPITE

MUCH TALK ABOUT REFORM, THE PARTY NOW SEEMS TO BE IN A JAW-BONING PHASE IN WHICH GREAT EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO RAISE LABOR EFFICIENCY BY PROPAGANDA APPEALS MIXED WITH SOME MATERIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INCENTIVES. THE INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT RESTRUCTURING LONG SAID TO BE FORTHCOMING SHOWS NO SIGNS OF APPEARING. THE RESHUFFLE IN FARM ADMINISTRATION URGED BY BREZHNEV HAS EITHER DIED ABORNING OR IS QUIESCENT. AGRICULTURE MINISTER POLYANSKIY AND THOUSANDS OF FARM BUREAUCRATS HAVE PROBABLY BEEN REPRIEVED BY THE FAILURE OF THIS INITIATIVE. SOME HIGH-LEVEL DISCONTENT WITH THE LEADERSHIP'S ABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS TO ADOPT EFFECTIVE CHANGES HAS RECENTLY BECOME APPARENT. SPECIFICALLY, FAILURE TO PROGRESS WITH THE LONG-RANGE PLAN RUNNING TO 1990 SEEMS TO BE UNDER SOME CRITICISM, AND THIS MAY INTENSIFY DURING 1975 WHEN PREPARATIONS WILL BE UNDERWAY FOR THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS.

4. FOREIGN INPUTS: THE PLANNERS' PROBLEM. THE CAUSES FOR DELAY ARE SEVERAL. PLANS BASED ON LARGE AMERICAN OR WESTERN INPUTS OF CAPITAL AND TECHNOLOGY SEEM THREATENED IN VIEW OF THE SOVIET REJECTION OF THE U.S. TRADE BILL. WHILE THE DIFFICULTIES MAY BE SMOOTHED AWAY OR AMELIORATED IN 1975, THE PLANNERS ARE STILL FACED WITH SEVERAL UNKNOWNNS, ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE NECESSARY FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY MAY BE PURCHASED FOR CASH.

5. DECISION MAKING HINDERED BY BREZHNEV'S POOR HEALTH. IT SEEMS REASONABLE TO SUPPOSE THAT THE CONDITION OF THE TOP POLITICAL LEADERSHIP HAS BECOME A GROWING CONCERN FOR THE SOVIETS BECAUSE OF THE DETERIORATING HEALTH OF BREZHNEV. IN VIEW OF BREZHNEV'S PRIMARY ROLE IN DECISION MAKING, HIS ABSENCES PROBABLY HAVE INTERFERED WITH OR DELAYED THE POLITICAL DECISION OF KEY ISSUES. EVEN IF BREZHNEV RECOVERS SUCCESSFULLY FROM HIS PRESENT ILLNESS, THE POLITBURO MEMBERS MUST REALIZE THAT HIS PRECARIOUS HEALTH WILL CONTINUE TO HAMPER

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DECISION MAKING IN THE FUTURE. IN SHORT, THERE ARE NOW REASONS FOR THE SOVIETS TO GIVE SERIOUS THOUGHT TO THE POLITICAL SUCCESSION. THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS, WHICH SHOULD BE HELD IN MARCH-APRIL OF 1976, SHOULD BEGIN ON THE LOCAL LEVEL IN THE LATE SPRING OF 1975 AS PRIMARY PARTY ORGANIZATIONS ELECT A NEW SLATE OF OFFICIALS. THIS CYCLE WILL MOVE UP THROUGH THE TERRITORIAL-ADMINISTRATIVE PYRAMID WITH KRAY AND OBLAST ELECTIONS BEING HELD IN THE FALL. PERSONNEL CHANGES MADE AT THAT TIME MAY GIVE SOME INDICATION OF THE MOVEMENT OF VARIOUS PARTY FACTIONAL GROUPINGS ON THE EVE OF THE PARTY CONGRESS.

6. A SUCCESSION SCENARIO. HOWEVER, IF BREZHNEV FINDS HIMSELF UNABLE TO CONTINUE IN OFFICE FOR PHYSICAL REASONS, OR, LESS LIKELY, FINDS HIMSELF OUSTED BY POLITICAL RIVALS, THE

CRISIS OF SUCCESSION WOULD BE UNDERWAY IMMEDIATELY. OUR
GUESS AT THIS TIME IS THAT IF BREZHNEV WERE NOT IN FULL
COMMAND OF HIS FACULTIES AND HIS POLITICAL MACHINERY AT
THE TIME OF HIS DEPARTURE A FAIRLY SHORT LIVED COLLECTIVE
LEADERSHIP COMPOSED OF THE FOUR REMAINING SENIOR LEADERS --
KOSYGIN, KIRILENKO, PODGORNYY, AND SUSLOV -- WOULD RULE.
UNDER THIS ARRANGEMENT, KIRILENKO AS PARTY FIRST SECRETARY
WOULD BE BEST PLACED TO ACQUIRE POWER BUT WOULD NOT KEEP IT
LONG BECAUSE OF HIS ADVANCED AGE. (THERE ARE RECENT IN-
DICATIONS THAT HE MAY HAVE ADDED THE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AREA
OF PROPAGANDA DIRECTION TO HIS LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITIES.)

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USDEL MBFR VIENNA.

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7. POSSIBLE NEW LEADERS. WERE BREZHNEV TO STEP DOWN VOLUNTARILY
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BECAUSE OF ADVANCING AGE AND INFIRMITIES, IT SEEMS LOGICAL THAT HE WOULD BYPASS THE PRESENT SENIOR LEADERSHIP IN SEARCH OF A POLITICAL HEIR WHO COULD BE COUNTED ON TO ENHANCE HIS LEGACY. THIS WOULD BRING OPPORTUNITY FOR A CURRENT TOP LEADER IN THE 50-60 YEAR OLD BRACKET. TWO NAMES COME TO MIND: BREZHNEV'S ASSOCIATE FROM THE UKRAINE, V.V. SHCHERBITSKIY, AND BREZHNEV'S CHOICE AS PARTY SECRETARY FOR AGRICULTURE, F.D. KULAKOV. BOTH CANDIDATES ARE LESS THAN PERFECT; SHCHERBITSKIY LACKS NON-UKRAINIAN LEADERSHIP EXPOSURE, AND KULAKOV'S HEALTH MAY RULE HIM OUT. BREZHNEV WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BYPASS SHELPIKIN AS A CONFIRMED RIVAL. TIME MAGAZINE TO THE CONTRARY, WE DO NOT NOW REGARD ANDROPOV AS A CANDIDATE FOR TOP POWER. THE OTHER INCUMBENTS ON THE CPSU SECRETARIAT LOOK LIKE THE DARKEST OF HORSES. KAPITONOV HOLDS A KEY POST IN PARTY PERSONNEL WORK BUT LACKS STATURE; KATUSHEV IS TOO YOUNG AND TOO SPECIALIZED IN BLOC PARTY WORK; AND DOLGIKH LACKS BROAD EXPERIENCE OUTSIDE MINING AND HEAVY INDUSTRY. NEVERTHELESS, IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT THE POLITBURO IS A SELF-SUSTAINING BODY AND CPSU SECRETARIES ARE BEST PLACED INSTITUTIONALLY TO GATHER THE REINS OF POWER.

8. PROBABLE ISSUES. THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL POWER IN THE USSR, AS ELSEWHERE, IS USUALLY CLOTHED IN ISSUES. IF SUCH A STRUGGLE WERE TO TAKE PLACE HERE, IT IS MOST LIKELY THAT QUESTIONS OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION PRIORITIES WOULD BE THE POLICY FOCUS AROUND WHICH THE BATTLE WOULD BE WAGED. SUBJECT TO DISPUTE MIGHT BE THE RELATIVE EMPHASIS ON LIGHT VERSUS HEAVY INDUSTRY (SEE SEPTEL) AND DEFENSE SPENDING (AS WITH MALENKOV/KHRUSCHEV) AND ON MECHANIZATION OR REORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; CULTURAL POLICY AND TREATMENT OF DISSIDENTS COULD ALSO PLAY A ROLE. IF FOREIGN POLICY BECAME A FACTOR (AS WITH STALIN/TROTSKY), THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THE MODALITIES OF DETENTE COULD CONCEIVABLY BECOME A BONE OF CONTENTION, PARTICULARLY IN THAT SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. DETERMINE NOT ONLY THEIR DIPLOMACY, BUT AFFECT INTERNAL RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS AS WELL. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS CURRENTLY

NO CLEARLY VISIBLE TOP LEADERSHIP DISPUTE IN ANY OF THESE AREAS AND NO ANTI-DETENTE GROUP THAT WE CAN IDENTIFY. THE LAST AVOWED FOE OF DETENTE IN THE POLITBURO -- SHELEST OF THE UKRAINE -- WAS REMOVED FROM HIS POST AND UNCEREMONIOUSLY RETIRED BECAUSE OF SUCH OPPOSITION. HOWEVER, THERE HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN SOME CRITICISM IN THIS AREA RECENTLY IN THE CONFIDENTIAL

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WAKE OF THE SOVIET REJECTION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. TRADE BILL AND SUCH CRITICISM COULD GROW.

9. THE INTERNAL OPPOSITION. THE SOVIETS HAVE PAID A SIGNIFICANT PRICE IN TERMS OF THEIR POLITICAL IMAGE IN THE WEST FOR THEIR TACTICS IN DEALING WITH THEIR DOMESTIC POLITICAL OPPOSITION. THE DECISION TO PERMIT THE KGB TO PURSUE VARIED TACTICS IN ROOTING OUT AND SUPPRESSING THE OPPOSITION WHILE AVOIDING AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE PUBLIC DISPLAYS OF BEASTLINESS HAS RESULTED IN THE OPPOSITION BEING BLEED WHITE BY SELECTIVE INCARCERATION, HARASSMENT, AND EXILE, BOTH VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY. THE FORCIBLE EXPULSION OF SOLZHENITSYN APPARENTLY MARKED A WATERSHED IN THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE DISSIDENT COMMUNITY. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO BE PLAGUED BY INCOMING RADIO INFORMATION ON DOMESTIC EVENTS AND BY THE DOMESTIC CIRCULATION OF FORBIDDEN LITERATURE. BUT THE POLICY OF PHYSICAL REMOVAL OF KEY FIGURES IN THE DISSIDENT COMMUNITY IS TAKING A HEAVY TOLL. ONE OF THE CHIEF MEANS OF PROTECTION OF THE KNOWN DISSIDENTS HAS BEEN WESTERN PUBLICITY, BUT AS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS MULTIPLY IN THE WEST, READERSHIP INTEREST IN SOVIET DOMESTIC AFFAIRS MAY BE EXPECTED TO DECREASE. DISSIDENTS ARE THUS IN A MORE EXPOSED POSITION THAN BEFORE.

10. THE MOST VEXING PROBLEM FOR THE REGIME IN THIS FIELD CONTINUED TO BE THE ACTIVITIES OF SAKHAROV AND HIS GROUP, WHO EXPANDED THEIR EXPOSURES OF VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION THROUGHOUT THE YEAR. THE REGIME HAS NIPPED AWAY AT THE EDGES OF THE GROUP BY HARASSING AND SOMETIMES IMPRISONING INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED WITH IT, BUT AS YET HAS NOT TAKEN STRONG ACTION AGAINST SAKHAROV HIMSELF. HE HAS SPOKEN OUT RECENTLY AGAINST THREATS AGAINST THE LIVES OF MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, ALLEGEDLY ORIGINATING IN THE KGB, BUT HE HAS NOT CURTAILED HIS ACTIVITIES. IN FACT, SOME CLOSE TO HIM APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT HE IS SPREADING HIMSELF TOO THIN. SOME OBSERVERS THINK THAT THE REGIME WILL EVENTUALLY BE FORCED TO SEEK A SOLZHENITSYN-TYPE SOLUTION TO THE SAKHAROV PROBLEM, BUT THERE WERE FEW OUTWARD SIGNS OF SUCH ACTION AT YEAR'S END.

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AMEMBASSY LONDON

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11. RUMBLES WERE ALSO HEARD FROM OTHER DISSIDENT GROUPS,

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CHIEFLY NON-RUSSIAN NATIONALIST AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS. BUT THE REGIME DEALT WITH THEM BASICALLY AS IT HAD IN THE PAST, SUPPRESSING SOME FORCEFULLY, SUCH AS THE LITHUANIAN CATHOLICS, AND CHOOSING TO IGNORE OTHERS. TRADITIONAL AREAS OF NATIONALITY PROBLEMS SUCH AS THE UKRAINE AND THE BALTIC STATES SEEM TO BE RELATIVELY QUIESCENT.

12. SOVIET JEWS. JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION DROPPED BY ABOUT FORTY PERCENT FROM THE 1973 LEVEL OF 35,000. THE REGIME WENT TO CONSIDERABLE LENGTHS TO BRING THE FIGURE DOWN TO A MORE ACCEPTABLE LEVEL. THIS WAS DONE BY (A) INSTITUTING MORE COMPLICATED APPLICATION PROCEDURES AND THEREBY SLOWING DOWN PROCESSING OF EMIGRANTS; (B) PROPAGANDIZING THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN ISRAEL AND THE WEST TO DISCOURAGE PROSPECTIVE EMIGRANTS, AND (C) SELECTIVELY HARASSING AND REFUSING EXIT TO CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF APPLICANTS TO KEEP EMIGRATION-PRONE JEWS IN A STATE OF UNCERTAINTY; AS TO THEIR PROSPECTS. THERE WERE SEVERAL POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THIS DECREASE. SOME SAY THAT THE REGIME WAS INITIALLY TRYING TO FORCE ACTION ON THE MFN QUESTION BY DEMONSTRATING TO THE WESTERN "OPPONENTS OF DETENTE" THAT IT COULD BE GENEROUS, AS IN 1973, OR STINGY, AS DURING THE PAST YEAR, ON THE JEWISH EMIGRATION QUESTION. THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN ALSO SEEMED TO HAVE HAD SOME REAL EFFECT ON CAUSING PROSPECTIVE EMIGRANTS TO HOLD BACK THEIR APPLICATIONS. IN ANY CASE, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT CURRENTLY INTEND TO LET THE EMIGRATION LEVEL RISE IN RETURN FOR TRADE CONCESSIONS FROM THE U.S. AS IN PAST YEARS, A TRICKLE OF URBAN JEWISH ACTIVISTS HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO DEPART THE COUNTRY, CAUSING SOME TO SPECULATE THAT THE AUTHORITIES HAVE A SYSTEM FOR LETTING A FEW ACTIVISTS OUT AT A TIME IN ORDER NOT TO CAUSE DISRUPTION OR GIVE THE WRONG SIGNALS ABOUT THE "FREEDOM" OF EMIGRATION.

13. CULTURAL SCENE. THE CULTURAL WINDS BLEW HOT AND COLD DURING THE YEAR WITH SOME CONFUSING RESULTS. THE MOST INTRIGUING UNEXPLAINED PHENOMENON WAS THE DEMOTION OF DEMICHEV FROM PARTY SECRETARY IN CHARGE OF CULTURE TO MINISTER OF CULTURE AND THE FAILURE OF THE DECEMBER PLENUM TO NAME A PARTY SUCCESSOR FOR THAT JOB. AS SOLZHENITSYN WAS BEING EXPELLED, TO THE APPARENT PLEASURE OF A NUMBER OF ESTABLISHED WRITERS, MORE WORKS BY AND ABOUT SUCH FORMERLY CONFIDENTIAL

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OUT-OF-FAVOR (AND NO LONGER LIVING) WRITERS AS BULGAKOV, MANDELSHTAM, AKHATOVA, OLESHA AND BABEL WERE BEGINNING TO BE SEEN. FEW MODERN NON-CONFORMIST WORKS APPEARED, ALTHOUGH THE SOMEWHAT OFFBEAT POETRY OF VOSNESENSKIY, AKHAMDULINA, YEVTUSHENKO, AND THE LENINGRADERS DUSHNER AND SOSNORA, MADE

ITS WAY INTO SEVERAL LITERARY JOURNALS. SLAVOPHILE AND VILLAGE WRITERS WHO EMPHASIZED THE TRADITIONS AND VALUES OF OLD RUSSIA WERE POPULAR, WITH SOLOUKHIN BY FAR THE MOST PROLIFIC. ONE SETBACK FOR THE MORE LIBERAL-MINDED WAS THE SACKING OF THE MODERATE EDITOR OF THE IMPORTANT JOURNAL NOVY MIR AND HIS REPLACEMENT BY A CONSERVATIVE FORMER OFFICIAL OF THE WRITERS UNION. WHILE MOVIES WERE GENERALLY DULL AND UNAPPEALING, THE MOSCOW AND LENINGRAD THEATER SCENES HAD SEVERAL BRIGHT SPOTS FOR THOSE INTERESTED IN INNOVATION AND BREAKING OF TRADITION.

14. BESIDES THE SOLZHENITSYN AFFAIR, THE ART SCENE MADE THE MOST NEWS IN 1974. NON-UNION, NON-CONFORMIST ARTISTS CAME OUT OF THE UNDERGROUND FOR A WHILE AND OFFERED A CHALLENGE TO THE SYSTEM'S IDEAS ABOUT ABSTRACT NON-SOCIALIST REALIST PAINTINGS, SKILLFULLY USING THE WESTERN PRESS TO PLAY ON THE REGIME'S EFFORTS AT IMAGE BUILDING AFTER THE VIOLENT BREAKING-UP OF AN UNOFFICIAL ART SHOW IN MOSCOW, THEY WERE ABLE TO FORCE THE CULTURAL TSARS INTO AUTHORIZING A HUGE EXHIBIT OF PICTURES IN A MOSCOW PARK, WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN THE CULTURAL HAPPENING OF THE PAST FEW DECADES. LENINGRAD UNOFFICIAL ARTISTS FOLLOWED UP WITH A SIMILAR INDOOR SHOW, BUT BY THE END OF THE YEAR THE CULTURAL AUTHORITIES HAD REGROUPED THEIR FORCES AND MAJOR CRACKS APPEARED IN THE ONCE DETERMINED AND UNIFIED NON-CONFORMIST ART COMMUNITY. THE LAST SHOT HAS NOT BEEN FIRED IN THIS RUNNING BATTLE, HOWEVER, AND WE EXPECT THE ARTISTS TO PRESENT SOME PROBLEMS TO THE AUTHORITIES DURING THE COMING MONTHS.

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15. PUBLIC LIFE. PARTY ORGANIZATIONS HAVE BEEN URGED DURING
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THE YEAR TO PUSH TWO MAJOR GOALS IN THEIR PROPAGANDA
ACTIVITIES: SOCIALIST LABOR COMPETITION AS THE PRIMARY MEANS
OF BOOSTING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY, AND A GENERAL TIGHTENING OF
THE PARTY'S IDEOLOGICAL MACHINERY TO OFFSET THE UNDESIRABLE
CONSEQUENCES OF DETENTE. BOTH CAMPAIGNS ARE STILL VERY MUCH
UNDER WAY, BUT BOTH FACE DIFFICULTIES. EFFORTS TO BOOST
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY BY ORGANIZED APPEALS FOR COMPETITION ARE
STALE AND TIMEWORN. THE BASIC PROBLEM IN FIGHTING THE IM-
PORTATION OF INFORMATION AND IDEAS FROM ABROAD IS THAT THE
SOVIET REGIME IS TRYING TO OPPOSE SOMETHING WITH NOTHING.
NO NEW IDEAS OR ATTRACTIVE INNOVATIONS IN IDEOLOGY OR PUBLIC
LIFE HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD FOR YEARS. FOREIGN MUSIC, STYLES,
AND MOVIES ARE VASTLY SUPERIOR TO SOVIET EQUIVALENTS AND
SOVIET YOUTH PREFER THE FORMER WHEN OBTAINABLE. THE REGIME
DOES BETTER IN EXPLOITING WARTIME PATRIOTISM AND RUSSIAN
NATIONALISM AND 1975 WILL SEE A CONTINUATION OF THIS.

16. THE PUBLIC AS A WHOLE IS MORE INTERESTED IN IMPROVING ITS
LIVING CONDITIONS AND MATERIAL ASPECTS OF LIFE THAN IN PUBLIC
ISSUES. THE ADVANCE OF THE AUTOMOBILE AGE IN THE USSR ONLY
AGGRAVATES THIS BASIS ATTITUDE AND INTENSIFIED EFFORTS TO

MAXIMISE INCOME AND BENEFITS, BUT WITHOUT ACTUALLY WORKING
TERRIBLY HARD FOR SUCH REWARDS. THE PUBLIC EXPECTS AND HAS
CO NTINUED TO RECEIVE A SMALL ANNUAL INCREASE IN THE STANDARD OF
LIVING AND MOST PEOPLE SEEM TO BE SATISFIED WITH THIS.
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